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NON-EFFICIENCY CALCULATIONS*
(Macroeconomics, environment, politics & society)
Fleischer Tamás
1. DECISIONS ABOUT INVESTMENT PROJECTS, TRANSFORMING THE ENVIRONMENT,
SHOULD NOT BE MADE ON THE BASIS OF SHORT-RUN FINANCIAL RETURN.
Before all else I wish to indicate that in my view the arguments highlighting the
contradictions in the economic justification of the Bôs-Nagymaros Barrage (BNB)
and question it in detail are important and not insignificant. However, I feel it is
necessary to put the issue in perspective and to review the underlying calculations in
a wider context, but of course not instead of these debates.
In line with these calculations, the project if profitable if financial return can be
noted within a reasonable period of time or it is not profitable if the project fails to
bring return for the investor by that time.
                                                
* Paper prepared for presentation at the conference on "Danube Dams" organised by
the Danube Circle, the International Rivers Network and the Worldwide Fund for
Nature in Budapest 2-4 September 1988, against the construction of the
Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Hidroelectric Dam. Published in Hungarian together with
the other papers of the conference in the book "Utánunk az özönvíz" Budapest
1989.
2 FLEISCHER RESEARCH PERIPHERY BUDAPEST SÍP U. 6
I do say that an investment project, affecting a huge chunk of the country and a
large slice of the population, triggering structural changes and transforming the
environment, does not have to provide short-term payback in terms of cash. If a
project helps to safeguard huge reserves of portable water, to protect existing gravel-
filtration wells, to improve the natural process of purification in contaminated
waters, to stabilize the riverbed, to contribute to better flood control, to guarantee the
level of ground waters, to satisfy agricultural interests, to settlements as well as
comfortable holidays for others, and uninterrupted navigation -- well -- in that case it
would be irrational to expect from such a project that the capital invested should also
bring return in a financial sense for the bank Naturally, profitability calculations
would remain sensible even in that case since there are a number of ways to achieve
a number of different objectives, and an especially important consideration in
comparing different alternatives is: which one will be the cheapest to implement in
order to achieve the objective? Viewed from this point, the BNB project is
controversial on a number of counts. As for the environmental impact, the very
opposite of the factors listed above are true: it will contaminate the reserves of
potable water, it will clog the gravel-filtration wells, it will impede natural
purification of waters, etc. The most, the builders could reply for most of these
questions was that it is not likely that it will cause contamination; a solution could be
found to prevent wells from clogging, etc. So, they are not positive about it, all that
was offered was the negation of negative effects, or, at best, that the current status
can be restored or maintained. It is the very lack of positive structural elements that
renders the debate barren, as if the profitability of energy generation would be the
major issue which is hardly justifiable anyway. If no positive objectives are
formulated at all, it is difficult to expect that a debate should address the alternative
ways of attainment. What is left is just "one single alternative", and I do say that
financial return in that case is not a decisive argument.
On the one hand, it cannot be a decisive aspect in a long-term project since the
project itself may well be useful although financial return may be lacking; and the
other way round: even if there would be a payback in the short run, the project might
be detrimental, requiring immediate halting. For example: a tunnel may be designed
to be built under the Danube in the inner city of Budapest where it would ease traffic,
but the structural damage it would cause in the structure of city would render
anything of the kind a defective decision. A cultural institution may be profitable
with saleable products while causing structural damage in the long run. In such cases
the external effects, ie, those over and above return, may exceed many times the
benefit to be measured in terms of cash.
On the other hand, however, financial return is not a real argument for the actual
decision maker either. It is clear that decisions are not made on basis: Profitability
calculations are instruments of post-fact justification. It is important to pin-point
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distortions in the calculations would not set the decision-makers worrying, since
these do not represent random, inadvertent errors on their behalf.
2. THE ERRORS COMMITTED DO NOT ARISE AS A RESULT OF RANDOM MISTAKES, THEY
ARE THE PRODUCTS OF THE INTERNAL LOGIC OF MACROECONOMIC MECHANISM
BASED ON REDISTRIBUTION
An essential feature of centralisation/redistribution is that the survival, the
operation in general and the financial performance in particular, of enterprises,
instructions and sectors do not depend directly on market events but on access to
reallocated resources. Consequently, enterprises or institutions are not focusing on
the provision of services and satisfying market needs but on manoeuvreing
themselves into good position when bargaining for resources to be distributed, which
is more important than anything else. We are all familiar with the different methods,
ranging from simple corporate tricks to all-out fights by settlements to be given
"town" or "special holiday zone" status. And as free resources to be reallocated
become scarcer, the fight for them becomes fiercer. Even the distributor finds
himself in a bind and he is pushed towards emergency actions, ie, providing money
to areas where immediate failure is pending in the economy.
This, however, defines the strategy adopted by those bargaining for resources to
be reallocated, rendering a near-bankruptcy to be their most efficient normal status of
operations. Unlike in a market economy, it is not profitability that brings the greatest
benefit, but pending bankruptcy. Spectacular traffic jams on the roads, for example,
justify the need for a highway, a bridge, etc.; if the factory stops producing, imports
may be liberalized. Sometimes pure chance may help: if fire follows fire, more
should, perhaps, be spent on water cannons, and impending floods necessitate dam
improvements. However, it is not always worth while to rely on pure chance. If a
bridge is cleverly built (or closed down) traffic jams can be triggered artificially
which would pre-determine future investment projects. Of course, a permanent threat
of flooding would not allow for tension to subside; and of course, if the
contamination of waters becomes a burning issue, water purification and others
would be jobs demanding technical solutions which would mean their appreciation
as tasks to be financed. BNB is demanding project in itself and justifies efforts made
in order to be involved in it. But even if only a quarter of the current concerns prove
true after its completion, the importance of the sector would increase substantially,
together with the money to be earmarked for the sector.
The series of steps are, therefore, logical and do not deviate from the tactics
adopted by the mining or the or the transport industry, ie. the trick is to launch a
project that would define further steps for a long while thereby rigidifying and
retaining the structure, in this case the structure of distributions as well as the
positions acquired.
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So, the BNB is not unique at all, it has a number of predecessors including
Sztálinváros and the olefine project and it also has a number of contemporaries like
the unstoppable 'steam engine' of the Lágymányos bridge over the Danube, and in a
wider sense, the 'development by bulldozers' scheme is also to be regarded as a close
relative considering its mechanism of implementation, the way opposing views and
the fact of international protest are suppressed which is discussed so extensively by
professionals and laymen alike in full agreement with one another.
So this distorted investment policy  based on campaigns can be regarded as
regular consequence of the macroeconomic mechanism based on reallocation of
resources.
Evidently, a greater role of the markets may trigger of process in production that
would help eliminate the underlying contradictions. However, infrastructural or
environmental projects are not decided by the government comes into play there, too.
Are the beneficiaries made to perform contortionist stunts there?
The answer is that problems may arise there too, since the beneficiaries of grants
may be interested in retaining their 'life-line' instead of doing away with it.
Agriculture, social policy, town development and the lame duck industries may
gobble up resources endlessly and wish to retain its status as beneficiary. But it is to
emphasized that the difference between the Hungarian system and that of the market
economies is that have a built-in set of checks and balances which prevents these
effects from becoming dominant.
3. SOCIAL CONTROL OVER DECISIONS SHOULD BE THERE TO ENSURE THAT MERIT
WOULD BE RECOGNISED INSTEAD OF BANKRUPTCY AND MERE NEED
Price competition on the market and the constant entry of new producers,
together with other effects, keep the development of monopolies in check, ie. these
act as regulators, playing a controlling role, although imperfectly. However, no such
automatic control exists in a subsidy-oriented, reallocation-based sector: a social
method should be found to ensure that there is no decision-making monopoly.
In point of fact this is the real problem here: we have no social control
whatsoever. It is an of-stated fact these days that the Hungarian political system has
institutional channels for bottom-up, democratic control, and all political decisions,
made by those in power, float around in a void.
In practice, all decisions are wrapped in a numbo-jumbo of decision-making
expertise. This also implies mystifying political competence as well; similarly, a
myth prevails about 'specialists' competent to make decisions in purely technical
issues, or in technical issues intertwined with political ones: they are believed to be
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in possession of the essential Information because of their Position (an any
information they do not have is non-essential!) as well as in possession of the
Methods. It is common in social debates that the 'specialists' refer to the laymen's
ignorance and non-initiation, whereas it is not the man in the street who should learn
the professional jargon, the specialist should be able to present alternatives for
decision making to politicians, to MPs, to the community in plain language. The
layman should be entitle to call specialists to book if they fail to give a
comprehensible answer to his question; but what he gets instead is a rebuke for
asking "non-professional" questions.
Of course, if the general picture and the decision-making alternatives are
formulated in plain language, a bigger segment of society would be in a position to
exercise control over decisions, which would also mean an opportunity for them to
protect (or at least verbalise) their interests. Doing away with the decision-making
monopoly would mean the end of monopolising the protection of interests as well,
therefore this is by far not the simple technical step, or linguistic or conceptual issue
it would appear to be at first sight. (Of course, similar examples could be cited from
health care, the postal service or transport, which would be just as good as the one
taken from water management.) The myth around technical competence would
remain a natural weapon in the hands of any sectoral interest group so long as society
cannot force out the comprehensible evaluation and transparent comparison of real
decision-making alternatives through their elected representatives and the political
decision-making bodies. Only this can mean social control -- information for the
general public is no substitute, expecially if it comes only afterwards.
4. REDISTRIBUTION + THE ABSENCE OF SOCIAL CONTROL = A SELF-DEFEATING SYSTEM
WITH POSITIVE FEEDBACK
I have described two systemic features above, including redistribution and the
absence of social control, from the point of view of interests and their subsequent
manifestations. Below, I wish to deal with them and their parallel functioning to
appraise their global impact from the aspect of regulation.
Of the impact redistribution may have, reference is often made to the damage
done by the centralisation of resources. (meddling with processes, slowing down
prospering businesses, pushing standards downwards, squandering in the center, etc.)
Now, I am not looking into this phase, only the redistribution of the already
centralized resources is going to be subject to my scrutiny. So, the two variables will
include the sums already centralized but prior to redistribution and the resources
already reallocated. At first glance this seems to be an identity in that the two sums
are identical. For the purposes of reallocation this is also identical with the declared
maximum as well (ie.: what has been produced is only available for redistribution).
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In actual fact, however, access to the resources (ie. the fight for such resources,
the "turbulence") cost more and more and as we have just seen, justifies the logic for
otherwise non-affordable alibi investments which then group themselves into a
distorted structure. Having deducted their value, the sum of redistributed resources to
be utilised expediently is smaller than the sum total before redistribution. The greater
the sacrifices to be made in the fight for such resources, the more such redistribution
is to be regarded as a negative strategic game, whereas the process of redistribution
is to be regarded as a series of such games.
In summary, the arguments and efforts put forward and expended in support of
the construction of the Bôs-Nagymaros Barrage are in line with the foreseeable
strategy of a sector, trying to gain importance in a centralized redistributive
mechanism, lacking any social control by mystifying purely technological issues (ie.
by transforming a development scenario without any alternatives into an issue of
prestige), by sustaining conditions of pending bankruptcy in order to collar as much
of the central resources as possible, by forcing decision-making bodies into dead
alleys through further commitments towards the investment project.
The real depth of the crisis cannot, however be characterized by stating the fact
that we have a not very well founded and unprofitable investment but by admitting
that we have a lat of not very well founded and unprofitable investments and the
country cannot cease to have them because of her politico-economic regime since
they all a logical consequence of this regime.
The sectoral policies wavering on the brink of bankruptcy cannot add up to
anything else but a country wavering on the brink of bankruptcy. It is at the national
level that the total loss incurred through sectoral policies is aggregated. Everybody is
incurring losses, in need of subsidies, and not only for tactical reasons, but for
objective ones. This reinforces the belief that the given type of redistribution is really
needed. The investment projects gobbling up all the resources trigger a chain
reaction in the absence of real control and checks that could halt the process. Like a
debtor, forced to pull a bluff, who can survive only if he tries to convince new
creditors to lend him money, so expanding the range of his creditors.
It would be worthwhile to consider that there is no escaping forward from this
bind. By playing cleverly, one may win for a while and to the debit of others, even
though the total stake for the game is negative, but even such gains would become
more and uncertain because of the diminishing resources and in the very end only the
losses will be there to be shared.
Well proven routines can no longer help, radical changes are required, All earlier
decisions need to be reconsidered since they have been made on the basic of
distorted values. And at a time like that it is not only the projected value of the loss
or gain that matters; it the variance in the projection, the risk of the decision or the
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uncertainty is significant., meaning that further substantial commitment may arise
from the decision, that may be the very reason for discontinuing the investment
project.
The chances for backing out of the game, ie. the elbow room for restructuring ,
are constrained by investment commitments especially if they continue to support the
traditional structure. The new political mechanism incorporating social control
would need room to arrive at decisions.
Budapest, 30 August 1988.
